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trict attorney has no "clear right" to compel a criminal court judge
to restore cases onto the active calendar after they have been re-
moved for specific reasons.
In People v. Sanchez, the Criminal Court of New York County
held that a motorist charged with driving while intoxicated need
not be given Miranda warnings before being asked to undergo
chemical testing. Moreover, the Sanchez court stated that the de-
fendant's uncoerced refusal to submit to chemical testing was ad-
missible into evidence and was not a violation of his right against
self-incrimination.
Finally, in Berkshire Life Insurance Co. v. Fernandez, the Ap-
pellate Division, Second Department, construing CPLR 203(b)(5),
held that the use of that section's extension period was available to
a plaintiff where the limitation period for commencing an action
was fixed by an insurance contract.
The members of Volume 61 hope that the analysis of the top-
ics contained in The Survey will be of value to the New York
bench and bar.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
Expanding a trial court's discretion over criminal court calendars
Traditionally, the inherent power of a trial court to control its
calendar has rarely been challenged.' However, the current di-
Extremely valuable in understanding the CPLR are the five reports of the Advisory
Committee on Practice and Procedure. They are contained in the following legislative docu-
ments and will be cited as follows:
1957 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 6(b) ........................... FIRST REP.
1958 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 13 ............................... SECOND REP.
1959 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 17. ........ ........................... THIRD REP.
1960 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 120 ................... ............. FOURTH REP.
1961 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice
and Procedure ................................... FINAL REP.
Also valuable are the two joint reports of the Senate Finance Assembly Ways and Means
Committee:
1961 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 15 ............................. FIFTH REP.
1962 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 8 . . . ......... SIXTH REP.
I See, e.g., LTown Ltd. Partnership v. Sire Plan Inc., 108 App. Div. 2d 435, 441-42, 489
N.Y.S.2d 567, 572-73 (2d Dep't 1985); Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App. Div. 101, 104-05, 90
N.Y.S. 7,72, 775 (1st Dep't), aff'd sub nom. Riglander v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 181 N.Y.
531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905). See generally SIEGEL § 368, at 466 (court dictates rules governing
calendar practice).
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lemma concerning calendar congestion and delay in the criminal
courts2 has prompted questions regarding the extent of a judge's
discretion in calendar control.3 To remedy the backlog, trial courts
occasionally have ruled on matters which subsequently were held
to lie beyond their judicial authority.4 Recently, however, in Mor-
genthau v. Gold,5 the New York Court of Appeals upheld the ac-
tion of a lower court judge who dismissed an article 786 proceeding
on the basis that the district attorney had no "clear right" to com-
pel a criminal court judge to place cases from the reserve calendar
onto the active calendar.
In Morgenthau, Judge Jay Gold of the Criminal Court of the
City of New York, County of New York, in April and May of 1984,
removed several cases from the active calendar and placed them on
the reserve docket for specific reasons." The People attempted to
2 Cole, Courts and the Threat Of Litigation Overload, 27 N.H.B.J. 155, 155 (1986); Ad-
dress by Harold Medina, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, 1955 Homer S.
Cummings Lecture, New York University School of Law (Feb. 3, 1955); see also People v.
Jones, 126 Misc. 2d 919, 920, 484 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1984)
(backlog in New York County Criminal Court rose from 6,318 cases pending in November
1983 to 11,382 cases in October 1984); N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1986, at D23, col. 1 (by mid-
August 1986, backlog in Criminal Court had risen to nearly 29,000 cases).
See People v. Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d 194, 196-97, 456 N.E.2d 1179, 1180, 469 N.Y.S.2d
56, 57 (1983) (trial judge may not dismiss criminal proceeding based on "calendar control"
or "failure to prosecute"); People v. Kitt, 93 App. Div. 2d 77, 79, 460 N.Y.S.2d 799, 801 (1st
Dep't 1983) ("trial court must be very wary that administrative pressures relating to calen-
dar movement do not unduly influence it in the exercise of its sound discretion"); see also
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 380 (1982) (courts should not use calen-
dar control to relieve backlog); cf. Constantino, Judges as Case Managers, 17 TiMAL 56, 57
(Mar. 1981) (advocating judicial case management in the civil system); see generally Cole,
supra note 2, at 175 n.72 (bibliography of source material on caseload management
techniques).
4 See, e.g., Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d at 205, 456 N.E.2d at 1185, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 61-62; Kitt,
93 App. Div. 2d at 79, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 801; People v. Cangiano, 40 App. Div. 2d 528, 529,
334 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (2d Dep't 1972); see also People v. Jones, 79 App. Div. 2d 717, 719,
434 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732 (3d Dep't 1980) (Mahoney, J., dissenting) (trial court abused discre-
tion in moving up trial date on grounds that court and jury had "nothing to do"), afl'd, 53
N.Y.2d 789, 422 N.E.2d 578, 439 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1981).
- 69 N.Y.2d 735, 504 N.E.2d 696, 512 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1987).
' CPLR 7801-7806 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1987). See infra note 11 (discussion of
article 78 proceedings).
7 Morgenthau, 69 N.Y.2d at 737, 504 N.E.2d at 696, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 369. The Office of
Court Administration has sanctioned a system of reserve calendars t6 which a case not yet
ready for trial may be removed. See People v. Jones, 126 Misc. 2d 919, 921, 484 N.Y.S.2d
415, 418-19 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1984).
1 Morgenthau v. Gold, 117 App. Div. 2d 386, 503 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't 1986). Five
prostitution cases and an assault case were placed on the reserve docket because the People
had not answered "ready for trial." Id. at 388, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 328-29. Judge Gold removed
seven drug cases from the active calendar because the People had not received laboratory
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restore a number of the cases to the active calendar by informing
Judge Gold that they were prepared to answer "ready."9 Judge
Gold refused and required that the People procure all the police
reports filed in the cases before he would entertain a motion to
restore. 10 Instead of producing the requested material," the dis-
trict attorney commenced an article 7812 proceeding petitioning for
a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Gold to reinstate the cases to
the active calendar.' 3 Special Term denied the application and
granted cross motions to dismiss.' 4 The Appellate Division, First
reports from police chemists. Id. at 388, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 328-29.
Id. at 388-89, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
10 Id. at 389, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 329. In the court's estimation, the People were unable to
answer "ready" until the supplementary documents were produced. Id. The People ob-
jected, contending that Judge Gold was obligated to restore these cases to active status
based on an earlier Court of Appeals decision, People v. Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d 194, 456
N.E.2d 1179, 469 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1983). Douglass involved a number of cases in which trial
judges had dismissed complaints based on the People's "failure to prosecute." The court
held that neither "failure to prosecute" nor "calendar control" were proper grounds for dis-
missal. Id. at 201, 456 N.E.2d at 1182, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 59. However, in discussing alterna-
tives that might relieve calendar congestion, the court stated:
A system of open or reserved dockets is an example of how cases of unwarranted
delay in prosecution can be dealt with properly. The cases are marked off the
active calendar, subject to the right of the prosecutor upon oral application to
have a case restored after filing the document, the absence of which led to the case
being placed on the reserve calendar, or in other situations, after becoming ready
to proceed, and so informing the court and the defendant.
Id. at 200, 456 N.E.2d at 1182, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 59 (emphasis added). The italicized language
marked a change from the Douglass slip opinion which had stated that a district attorney
may "apply for leave to restore" a case to the active calendar. People v. Douglass, slip op. at
6 (New York Court of Appeals) (cited in Morgenthau, 117 App. Div. 2d at 387-88, 503
N.Y.S.2d at 330). The Appellate Division in Morgenthau interpreted this language as grant-
ing to the district attorney the unqualified right to have cases placed on the reserve calendar
restored to active status. Morgenthau, 117 App. Div. 2d at 388, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
- Id. at 389, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
12 CPLR 7801-7806 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1987). Article 78 substituted for the com-
mon law writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. CPLR 7801, commentary at 25 (Mc-
Kinney 1972). The writ of mandamus compels the performance of an official duty clearly
imposed by law. Id. at 31. There must be no question of the absolute right to performance;
thus the duty must not be discretionary. Id. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of a
legal duty, not to direct the manner in which it will be performed. Klostermann v. Cuomo,
61 N.Y.2d 525, 540, 463 N.E.2d 588, 596, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 255 (1984).
" Morgenthau, 117 App. Div. 2d at 389, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 328. Petitioner alleged that a
judge had a "duty to restore these cases to the Active Calendar and that his refusal to do so
violated a clear legal right of petitioner." Id.
" Morgenthau v. Gold, 126 Misc. 2d 856, 484 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1985). The court concluded that the prior decision of the Court of Appeals in People v.
Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d 194, 456 N.E.2d 1179, 469 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1983), granted no absolute
right in the People to have criminal cases placed on the active calendar upon request. Mor-
genthau, 126 Misc. 2d at 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 458. Of considerable import is the fact that
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Department, reversed the trial court's ruling and ordered Judge
Gold to restore several of the cases to the active calendar. 1 The
Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition in a one line
opinion, and held that mandamus did not lie absent a clear legal
right to the relief sought.16
Writing for the majority in the appellate division, Presiding
Justice Murphy found that Judge Gold's actions effectively dis-
missed meritorious cases without allowing the People an opportu-
nity to be heard.'1 The court reasoned that prior case law sup-
ported the district attorney's unqualified right to have the fifteen
cases at issue restored to the trial calendar under these circum-
stances."8 Presiding Justice Murphy stated that Judge Gold had a
ministerial, non-discretionary duty to once again place these cases
on the active calendar. 9 The court, concluding that the mandamus
action was properly brought, granted the relief requested by the
eleven of the fifteen cases at issue were dismissed on "speedy trial," CPL § 170.30(1)(e)
(McKinney 1982), and "interest of justice," id. §§ 170.30(1)(g); 170.40 (McKinney 1982),
grounds in a collateral action, while Special Term's decision was pending, thus supporting
Judge Gold's advocacy of increased judicial control over court calendars. See People v.
Jones, 126 Misc. 2d 919, 929, 484 N.Y.S.2d 415, 424 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1984). In
Jones, the court addressed twelve of the cases at issue in Morgenthau. Id. at 922, 484
N.Y.S.2d at 419. In one of these cases, People v. Harris, the People withdrew opposition to
the motion for dismissal upon "speedy trial" grounds. Id. at 922 n.2, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 419
n.2. To avoid confusion, however, the court continued to refer to twelve cases rather than
the accurate number of eleven cases. Id.
Section 170.30(1)(e) of the CPL provides, in pertinent part, "[a]fter arraignment upon
an information, a simplified information, a prosecutor's information or a misdemeanor com-
plaint, the local criminal court may, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss such instrmnent
or any count thereof upon the ground that... [t]he defendant has been denied the right to
a speedy trial . . . ." CPL § 170.30(1)(e) (McKinney 1982). Furthermore, section 170.30(g)
provides for dismissal when "required in furtherance of justice, within the meaning of sec-
tion 170.40." Id. § 170.30(g).
That these statutes were used to dismiss eleven of the fifteen cases here at issue indi-
cates that the district attorney was not ready to prosecute them as he had stated at the time
that he requested that they be restored to the active calendar.
Morgenthau, 117 App. Div. 2d at 392-93, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
Morgenthau, 69 N.Y.2d at 737, 504 N.E.2d at 696, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 369. The court
did not address the specific issue of a trial court's discretion over criminal court calendars,
which was the primary focus of the Appellate Division opinion. See id.
17 Morgenthau, 117 App. Div. 2d at 392, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 331. The court added that a
contrary finding would "announce the abandonment of what must be a primary goal of any
civilized society: the deterrence and control of criminal conduct. The purpose of the court
system, and of court personnel, is to serve the community; to exalt expediency over sub-
stance is to violate that purpose." Id.
Id. at 387-88, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
Id. at 392-93, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
prosecution.20
Justice Milonas filed a vigorous dissent in which he asserted
that a prosecutor had no right, by means of a writ of mandamus, to
interfere with a judge's use of discretion.' The dissent contended
that, in actuality, the district attorney's complaint was with the
manner in which Judge Gold exercised his discretion, not with his
right to exercise it. 22 The result, according to Justice Milonas, was
that the prosecutor would have effective control over the court's
calendar, a matter which, traditionally, has rested within the trial
court's domain. 2' The dissent further asserted that since a prosecu-
tor has no right to proscribe the manner in which a judge should
exercise his discretion, the article 78 proceeding should have been
dismissed.24
The impact of the Court of Appeals decision in Morgenthau is
unclear.25 It is submitted that the act of maintaining cases on a
court's reserve calendar is within a judge's discretion, and not
merely a "ministerial duty." Exemplary dictum is an insufficient
basis" for allowing a district attorney to arrogate the court's inher-
20 Id.
"2 Id. at 396, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 334 (Milonas, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that
Douglass expressly affirmed the trial court's discretion over management of its calendar. Id.
at 395, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 333 (Milonas, J., dissenting). Justice Milonas further argued that the
majority's decision was contrary to the principles underlying Douglass. He asserted that
placing matters not yet ready for trial on the active calendar would further delay the al-
ready overburdened criminal court system. Id. (Milonas, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 396, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 333 (Milonas, J., dissenting). The dissent suggested that
the People's real quarrel with Judge Gold was that he was "too quick to place a case on the
Reserve Calendar and too slow to restore such matter to the Active Calendar." Id. (Milonas,
J., dissenting); see also Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 540, 463 N.E.2d 588, 596, 475
N.Y.S.2d 247, 255 (1984) (distinguish between discretion in whether acts are performed and
discretion in how acts are performed).
22 Morgenthau, 117 App. Div. 2d at 395-96, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 333 (Milonas, J., dissent-
ing). If the court must reactivate those prosecutions to which the People answer "ready,"
the calendar could become filled with cases, regardless of whether the district attorney is, in
fact, prepared to proceed to trial. Id. at 395, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 333 (Milonas, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 394, 396, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 332, 334 (Milonas, J., dissenting).
25 See Wise, Appeals Court Upholds Judge in Calendar Dispute with DA, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 22, 1987, at 1, col. 3. The head of the Appeals Bureau in the District Attorney's office,
Mark Dwyer, stated that the Court of Appeals' ruling did not resolve the underlying issue,
and that he would persist in his attempts to have similar cases restored to active status in
the future. Id. The Deputy Solicitor General in the state Attorney General's office countered
that the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's discretion in these matters by stating
that the district attorney had no "clear right" to the relief requested. Id. at 1, col. 4.
2" See Staber v. Fidler, 65 N.Y.2d 529, 482 N.E.2d 1204, 493 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1985) (per
curiam). "'No opinion is an authority beyond the point actually decided, and no judge can
write freely if every sentence is to be taken as a rule of law separate from its association.'"
[Vol. 61:672
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ent authority to exercise discretion in calendar control matters.27
The implementation of a reserve calendar system is itself a discre-
tionary, rather than a mandatory, requirement of law.28 Moreover,
the court has a positive obligation to make meaningful inquiry into
the People's statement of readiness.29
The People have recourse if the court abuses its discretion in
failing to place cases from the reserve to the active calendar.5 0
However, the facts in Morgenthau do not give rise to such a find-
ing." It is suggested that, contrary to the opinion of the appellate
division, retaining these cases on the reserve calendar was not the
"wholesale dismissal of meritorious cases. ' 32 The People were in no
way prejudiced by the maintenance of these cases on the reserve
Id. at 535, 482 N.E.2d at 1206, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (quoting Dougherty v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 266 N.Y. 71, 88, 193 N.E. 897, 902 (1934)); see also Crane v. Bennett, 177
N.Y. 106, 112, 69 N.E. 274, 275-76 (1904) (opinion should not be extended to cases in which
facts are essentially different); People v. Rosano, 69 App. Div. 2d 643, 654, 419 N.Y.S.2d
543, 549 (2d Dep't 1979) ("rule of stare decisis does not apply to dicta"), af'd, 50 N.Y.2d
1013, 409 N.E.2d 1357, 431 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1980).
27 See Plachte v. Bancroft, Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 437, 438, 161 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (1st
Dep't 1957) (inherent power of court over calendar control is "ancient and undisputed
law"); Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App. Div. 101, 104, 90 N.Y.S. 772, 774 (1st Dep't 1904)
(right to control court's business is within inherent discretion of court), aff'd sub nom.
Riglander v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905). As mentioned, the
precise matter before the court in Douglass was the dismissal of cases for failure to prose-
cute and for calendar control purposes. See supra note 10.
28 See Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d at 200, 456 N.E.2d at 1182, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
20 People v. Jones, 126 Misc. 2d 919, 924, 484 N.Y.S.2d 415, 421; see also People v.
Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337, 476 N.E.2d 287, 289-90, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890-91 (1985) (Peo-
ple's statement of readiness must be an "indication of present readiness, not a prediction or
expectation of future readiness").
30 See SIEGEL § 529, at 732-33. The Court of Appeals will not substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court unless there is absolutely no reasonable basis for court's use of
discretion "within the generous outer limits of the extensive range 'discretion' occupies ......
Id. at 732. See, e.g., People v. Kitt, 93 App. Div. 2d 77, 78, 460 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (1st Dep't
1983) (trial court abused discretion by forcing case to trial when assistant district attorney
was engaged in another trial and having difficulty locating witnesses); People v. Cangiano,
40 App. Div. 2d 528, 529, 334 N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (2d Dep't 1972) (abuse of discretion to
dismiss for failure to prosecute where adjournments were granted either by consent or on
application of defendant).
-1 Morgenthau, 126 Misc. 2d at 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 458. A court, in exercising its
judicial discretion may require the production of documents to prevent trial delay or mis-
trial. See id.; see also People v. Rickert, 58 N.Y.2d 122, 132, 446 N.E.2d 419, 423, 459
N.Y.S.2d 734, 738-39 (1983) (not abuse of discretion if all relevant factors were considered
before dismissing in interests of justice); People v. Bennette, 56 N.Y.2d 142, 148-49, 436
N.E.2d 1249, 1252, 451 N.Y.S.2d 647, 650 (1982) (within discretion to improperly interrupt
cross-examination to inquire into circumstances surrounding defendant's prior conviction).
2 Morgenthau, 117 App. Div. 2d at 392-93, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
1987]
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calendar, and could have proceeded with the prosecutions23 In-
stead, the People refused to comply with the court mandate to fur-
nish documents necessary for trial." Consequently, it was the dis-
trict attorney, not the trial court, who ultimately was responsible
for the subsequent dismissals. 6
Matters of calendar congestion have reached epidemic propor-
tions and are not easily resolved. 6 For this reason, it is essential
that parties be fully prepared on dates designated by the court."
This Survey has suggested that a viable method to ensure the Peo-
ple's preparedness was implemented by Judge Gold's refusal to re-
store to the active calendar cases not actually ready for trial. Fi-
nally, it is asserted that this calendar control technique was the
necessary result of the court's obligation to determine whether the
prosecution can substantiate its statement of its readiness for trial.
Because the Court of Appeals failed to address this specific issue,
the lower courts remain with insufficient guidance as to the precise
scope of judicial discretion in matters of calendar control. It is
hoped that the Court of Appeals will provide more comprehensive
33 See People v. Jones, 126 Misc. 2d 919, 923-24 & n.4, 484 N.Y.S.2d 415, 420 & n.4
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1984). The prosecution may proceed with discovery demands
and obligations at all times, in good faith, before trial, regardless of whether the case is on
the active or reserve calendar. See CPLR 240 (McKinney 1982). It is submitted that calen-
dar designation is also independent of the People's ability to prepare their case by, for ex-
ample, obtaining police reports, interviewing witnesses and negotiating with defendant's
counsel.
" Morgenthau, 117 App. Div. 2d at 393, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 332 (Milonas, J., dissenting);
see also Jones, 126 Misc. 2d at 928-29, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 423 (failure to actively prosecute
cases while article 78 proceeding pending, justified dismissal on "speedy trial" and "inter-
ests of justice" grounds).
31 See People v. Jones, 126 Misc. 2d at 925, 928, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 421, 423. A failure of
the People to procure necessary documents and otherwise announce their readiness for trial
warranted a dismissal on "speedy trial" grounds and failure to abide by court mandates
required an "interests of justice" dismissal. See id.; see also People v. Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d
413, 417, 407 N.E.2d 405, 407, 429 N.Y.S.2d 558, 560 (1980) (calendar congestion insufficient
to defeat defendant's right to dismissal on "speedy trial" grounds); People v. Hamilton, 46
N.Y.2d 932, 933, 388 N.E.2d 345, 345-46, 415 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (1979) (delay of one year
and thirteen days justifies "speedy trial" dismissal); People v. Bonterre, 87 Misc. 2d 243,
252-53, 384 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1976) (backlog of grand jury
presentments and reduced stenographic staff does not relieve People of duty to provide
speedy trial).
ss See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
'T See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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guidelines in the near future to prevent further confusion resulting
from ad hoc decisions by trial courts.
Suzanne Sonner Diviney
Miranda warnings not required when motorist charged with driv-
ing while intoxicated is requested to submit to chemical testing
The Constitution guarantees every individual the right to as-
sistance of counsel' and the privilege against self-incrimination in
criminal cases. 2 In Miranda v. Arizona,3 the United States Su-
preme Court held that a state has an affirmative duty to advise an
individual taken into police custody of these constitutional rights.4
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides in part that, "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ... and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id. The accused is guaranteed the right to coun-
sel not only at his trial but at any critical confrontation with the prosecution during pretrial
proceedings where the absence of counsel might impede his right to a fair trial. See United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). The fourteenth amendment has extended this
right to state criminal proceedings. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
Therefore, the accused "need not stand alone against the State" during any critical stage of
the prosecution. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16-38, at 1106-08 (1978) (discussing implications of right to counsel on criminal jus-
tice reform).
2 U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in part that "[n]o person ...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.. . ." Id. The four-
teenth amendment precludes a state from abridging an individual's right against compul-
sory self-incrimination. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). Since the American sys-
tem of criminal prosecution is accusatorial rather than inquisitorial, both state and federal
governments are "constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently
and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his
own mouth." Id. at 7-8. However, the fifth amendment privilege protects an accused only
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the state with evidence
of a testimonial or communicative nature. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764
(1966). This privilege does not apply to the withdrawal of blood for chemical analysis, as
this act is not considered testimonial compulsion. Id. at 765. See also People v. Haitz, 65
App. Div. 2d 172, 175, 411 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59-60 (4th Dep't 1978) (admission of evidence of
refusal to take chemical test not violative of fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-23, at 709-10 (overview of fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination).
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 467-69. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that an individual taken into cus-
tody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
